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LEARNING IN TIME-VARYING GAMES
BENOIT DUVOCELLE♯, PANAYOTIS MERTIKOPOULOS⋆,
MATHIAS STAUDIGL♯, AND DRIES VERMEULEN♯
Abstract. In this paper, we examine the long-term behavior of regret-mi-
nimizing agents in time-varying games with continuous action spaces. In its
most basic form, (external) regret minimization guarantees that an agent’s
cumulative payoff is no worse in the long run than that of the agent’s best
fixed action in hindsight. Going beyond this worst-case guarantee, we consider
a dynamic regret variant that compares the agent’s accrued rewards to those of
any sequence of play. Specializing to a wide class of no-regret strategies based
on mirror descent, we derive explicit rates of regret minimization relying only
on imperfect gradient observations. We then leverage these results to show that
players are able to stay close to Nash equilibrium in time-varying monotone
games – and even converge to Nash equilibrium if the sequence of stage games
admits a limit.
1. Introduction
A key requirement for decision-making in unknown, non-stationary environments
is the minimization of regret: no rational agent would want to realize in hindsight
that the decision policy they employed was strictly inferior to a crude policy pre-
scribing the same action at each stage. Of course, depending on the context, this
worst-case guarantee admits several refinements. For one, agents could tighten their
baseline and, instead of comparing their accrued rewards to those of the best fixed
action, they could employ more general “comparator sequences” that evolve over
time. For another, if agents interact with one another and their rewards are deter-
mined by a fixed underlying mechanism – that of a non-cooperative game – there
are much finer criteria that apply, chief among them being that of convergence to
a Nash equilibrium.
Since real-world scenarios are rarely stationary and typically involve several in-
teracting agents, both issues are of high practical relevance and should be treated
in tandem. With this in mind, the central question that we seek to address in this
paper can be stated as follows: What is the long-run behavior of strategic agents
♯Maastricht University, Department of Quantitative Economics, P.O. Box 616,
NL–6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
⋆Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, Inria, LIG, F-38000, Grenoble, France.
E-mail addresses: b.duvocelle@maastrichtuniversity.nl, panayotis.mertikopoulos@imag.fr,
m.staudigl@maastrichtuniversity.nl, d.vermeulen@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary 91A10, 91A26; secondary 68Q32, 68T02.
Key words and phrases. Dynamic regret; Nash equilibrium; mirror descent; time-varying
games.
The research of P. Mertikopoulos and M. Staudigl was partially supported by the COST Ac-
tion CA16228 “European Network for Game Theory” (GAMENET). P. Mertikopoulos is also
grateful for financial support by the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grant
no. ANR–16–CE33–0004–01 (ORACLESS).
1
2 B. DUVOCELLE, P. MERTIKOPOULOS, M. STAUDIGL, AND D. VERMEULEN
that adhere to a no-regret policy when the underlying game evolves over time in an
unknown, unpredictable manner?
Our contributions and prior work. Our analysis revolves around two main axes, as
outlined below:
Dynamic regret minimization. We begin with the so-called “unilateral setting”, i.e.,
when an agent seeks to minimize their regret against a fixed (but otherwise ar-
bitrary) stream of payoff functions. As a benchmark, we posit that the agent
compares the rewards accrued by their chosen sequence of play to any other test
sequence (as opposed to a fixed action). In particular, as a special case, this defi-
nition of regret also includes the agent’s best dynamic policy in hindsight, i.e., the
sequence of actions that maximizes the payoff function encountered at each stage
of the process.
This measure of regret is considerably more ambitious than the standard defi-
nition of external regret (which only considers constant sequences as performance
benchmarks). One of its antecedents is the notion of shifting regret which considers
piecewise constant benchmark sequences and keeps track of the number of “shifts”
relative to the horizon of play – see e.g., Cesa-Bianchi et al. [7]. Much closer in
spirit is the dynamic regret definition of Besbes et al. [4] which takes as a bench-
mark the sequence of instantaneous payoff maximizers (individual best responses)
of each stage; unfortunately however, it is not possible to achieve sublinear dynamic
regret if this sequence varies arbitrarily over time. To counter this, Besbes et al. [4]
introduced a restart procedure that amortizes a policy with no static regret over a
sequence of time windows of increasing length. In so doing, they showed that if the
“variation budget” of the stream of payoff functions encountered is sublinear,1 the
agent can indeed achieve no dynamic regret.
In view of this, our first step is to examine the applicability of this restart heuris-
tic against arbitrary test sequences. To that end, we show in Section 4 that a
carefully crafted restart procedure allows agents to achieve no dynamic regret rel-
ative to any slowly-varying test sequence (i.e., any test sequence whose variation
grows sublinearly with the horizon of play). Then, to obtain concrete bounds, we
focus on a family of learning policies known as online mirror descent (OMD), a flexi-
ble meta-algorithm that includes as special cases the online gradient descent (OGD)
method of Zinkevich [51], the multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm of Auer et al.
[2], the matrix exponentiation schemes of Tsuda et al. [49] and Mertikopoulos et al.
[25], and many others.2 Specifically, building on the restart principle outlined above,
we show in Section 6 that the class of policies under consideration attains a regret
minimization rate of O(T 2/3V 1/3T ) relative to test sequences with variation at most
VT over T stages.
This result essentially coincides with the bound obtained by Besbes et al. [4]
for slowly-varying streams of payoff functions and should be contrasted to recent
work by Hall and Willett [18], Jadbabaie et al. [21] and Shahrampour and Jad-
babaie [44] who established dynamic regret bounds without a restart procedure. In
1Specifically, the “variation budget” of a sequence of payoff functions ut, t = 1, 2, . . . T , is
defined as VBT =
∑T−1
t=1 ‖u
t+1 − ut‖∞.
2In the above, “descent” should really be “ascent”, because players are typically maximizers in
game theory. To avoid this clash in terminology, we use the more neutral term “proximal method”.
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particular, the analysis of Shahrampour and Jadbabaie [44] provides a better de-
pendence on the horizon of play T (T 1/2 instead of T 2/3), but a worse dependence
on the variation of the comparator sequence (V
1/2
T instead of V
1/3
T ). This suggests
that restarting is more advantageous in environments with higher variability: this
is an important observation that we encounter again (in a different guise) in the
game-theoretic analysis of Section 7.
Game-theoretic learning. The second element of our analysis concerns the under-
lying assumption that the sequence of payoff functions encountered is oblivious.
Concretely, this means that, when calculating the payoffs that the agent would
have obtained by employing a different sequence of actions, the stream of payoff
functions faced by the agent remains unchanged.
This assumption is well-grounded in the literature of (adversarial) online opti-
mization; however, in a game-theoretic setting, it is considerably more difficult to
justify. For instance, if two regret-minimizing players are involved in a game, the
payoff functions encountered by one player will be influenced by the action choices
of the other. Thus, if one player were to employ a different sequence of actions, the
other player would most likely respond differently, altering in this way the sequence
of payoff functions encountered by the first player (and vice versa). As such, in
a game-theoretic setting, even dynamic regret minimization does not necessarily
provide any equilibration guarantees.
To address this issue, we consider a general multi-agent framework where, at
every stage t = 1, 2, . . . , each player’s payoff function is determined by the action
choices of all other players via a non-cooperative game Gt. The stage game Gt
may vary with time, but the rules governing its evolution are not a priori known
to the players (so the rationalistic viewpoint of the literature on repeated/dynamic
games does not apply). By that token, the main question we seek to address can
be stated as follows: If all players adhere a dynamic regret minimization policy, do
their actions eventually track a Nash equilibrium of the stage game?
Without further assumptions, the answer to this question is “no”, even when
players face the same stage game throughout. Indeed, (static) regret minimization
in finite games guarantees that the players’ empirical frequencies of play converge
to the game’s Hannan set (also known as the set of coarse correlated equilibria).
However, as was shown by Viossat and Zapechelnyuk [50], this set may contain
strategies that assign positive weight only to dominated strategies (and these can-
not be supported at a Nash equilibrium). In fact, in two-player zero-sum games,
the analysis of Mertikopoulos et al. [26] shows that no-regret learning may cycle in-
definitely without converging, always remaining a bounded distance away from the
game’s Nash set. On the other hand, if the game satisfies a monotonicity condition
known as diagonal strict concavity (DSC), Mertikopoulos and Zhou [30] showed
that no-regret policies based on mirror descent converge to Nash equilibrium with
probability 1, even with imperfect gradient information on the players’ side.
Building on all this, we first prove that if a) the stage games are monotone; and
b) they admit a slowly-varying sequence of Nash equilibria, no-regret learning with
a judiciously chosen restart schedule allows players to remain close to the game’s
evolving equilibrium (at least on average). More to the point, as a refinement of this
result, we show that if the sequence of stage games converges to a strictly monotone
game, the induced sequence of play converges itself to a Nash equilibrium thereof.
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Importantly, this last result holds globally (i.e., independently of the algorithm’s
initialization) and with probability 1, irrespective of the magnitude of the noise
entering the players’ gradient signals.
In our view, these results comprise a first step towards understanding the be-
havior of utility-maximizing agents in unknown, online environments where the
top-down, “rationalistic” viewpoint of dynamic/stochastic games does not apply.
Specifically, even though the standard rationality postulates do not hold in our set-
ting (knowledge of the game being played, common knowledge of rationality, etc.),
our results show that no-regret learning can still lead to equilibrium in dynamic en-
vironments. We find this property of regret minimization particularly appealing, as
it provides an important link between online learning and the emergence of rational
behavior in strategic environments that evolve over time.
Notation. Given a finite-dimensional vector space V with norm ‖·‖, we will write V∗
for its (algebraic) dual, 〈y, x〉 for the duality pairing between y ∈ V∗ and x ∈ V , and
‖y‖∗ = sup{〈y, x〉 : ‖x‖ ≤ 1} for the dual norm of y ∈ V∗. If X is a closed convex
subset of V , we write ri(X ) for its relative interior and diam(X ) = sup{‖x′ − x‖ :
x, x′ ∈ X} for its diameter. Finally, if xt, t = 1, 2, . . . , is a sequence of elements of
X , we will write xT ≡ (xt)t∈T for the subfamily of elements indexed by a subset T
of N.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Concave games. The focal point of our analysis will be games with a finite
number of players and continuous action sets. Specifically, every player i ∈ N ≡
{1, . . . , N} is assumed to select an action xi from a compact convex subset Xi of a
finite-dimensional normed space Vi. Subsequently, based on each player’s individual
objective and the action profile x = (xi;x−i) ≡ (x1, . . . , xN ) of all players’ actions,
every player receives a reward, and the process repeats.
In more detail, writing X ≡ ∏i∈N Xi for the game’s action space and V ≡∏
i∈N Vi for its corresponding ambient space,3 we assume that each player’s reward
is determined by an associated payoff (or utility) function ui : X → R.4 Since
players are not assumed to “know the game” (or even that they are involved in one)
these payoff functions might be a priori unknown, especially with respect to the
dependence on the actions of other players. Following Rosen [40], our only blanket
assumption for ui will be that
ui(xi;x−i) is concave in xi for all x−i ∈ X−i, (2.1)
where, in obvious notation, X−i =
∏
j 6=i Xj denotes the action space of all players
other than the i-th one. For regularity purposes, it will also be convenient (albeit not
necessary) to assume that each ui is C
1-smooth in x; to streamline our presentation,
these will be our standing assumptions in what follows.
3Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, we will assume that V is endowed with the norm
‖x‖2 =
∑
i‖xi‖
2. Also, to streamline our presentation, we will use the same notation for the
norm of each factor space Vi and rely on the context to resolve any ambiguities.
4For book-keeping reasons, it will be convenient to assume that ui is actually defined on an
open neighborhood of X in V . However, none of our calculations depend on this device, so we do
not make this assumption explicit.
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With all this in hand, a concave game will be a tuple G ≡ G(N ,X , u) with
players, action spaces and payoffs defined as above. Below, we briefly discuss some
recurring examples of such games:
Example 2.1 (Mixed extension of finite games). In finite games, each player i ∈ N
chooses an action (or pure strategy) αi from a finite set Ai. The players’ payoffs
are then determined by the pure strategy profile α = (αi)i∈N of all players’ actions
via a collection of payoff functions ui : A ≡
∏
j Aj → R.
In the mixed extension of a finite game, players are allowed to randomize their
decisions by playing mixed strategies, i.e., probability distributions xi ∈ ∆(Ai) with
the interpretation that xiαi represents the probability of choosing action αi ∈ Ai.
In this case (and in a slight abuse of notation), the expected payoff to player i under
the mixed strategy profile x = (xi)i∈N is
ui(xi;x−i) =
∑
α1∈A1
· · ·
∑
αN∈AN
ui(α1, . . . , αN ) x1,α1 · · ·xN,αN . (2.2)
Since each player’s mixed strategy space Xi = ∆(Ai) is convex and ui is individually
linear in xi, we see that mixed extensions of finite games are concave in the sense
of (2.1).
Example 2.2 (Saddle-point problems). Consider a saddle-point problem of the gen-
eral form
min
x1∈X1
max
x2∈X2
f(x1, x2) (SP)
where each feasible region Xi, i = 1, 2, is a compact convex subset of Vi ≡ Rdi and
f : X1×X2 → R is assumed to be convex in x1 and concave in x2. Letting u1 = −f
and u2 = f , the saddle-point problem (SP) can be seen as a zero-sum game with
player set N = {1, 2} and payoff functions ui, i = 1, 2. Since f is convex-concave,
the resulting game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) is itself concave in the sense of (2.1).
Example 2.3 (Resource allocation auctions). Consider a service provider with a
splittable resource (bandwidth, computing cores, ad display time, etc.). Fractions
of this resource can be leased to a set ofN bidders (players) who can place monetary
bids xi ≥ 0 for the utilization of said resource up to each player’s total budget bi.
Once all bids are in, resources are allocated proportionally to each player’s bid,
i.e., the i-th player gets ρi = (qxi)
/
(c+
∑
j∈N xj) units of the auctioned resource,
with q denoting the total amount of the resource and c ≥ 0 representing an “entry
barrier” for bidding on it. A simple model for the utility of player i is then given
by
ui(xi;x−i) = giρi − xi, (2.3)
where gi denotes the marginal gain of player i from acquiring a unit slice of resources.
Writing Xi = [0, bi] for the action space of player i, it is easy to see that the resulting
game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) is concave in the sense of (2.1).
Many other important scenarios can be formulated as concave games; for an
incomplete list, see Kannan and Shanbhag [23], Facchinei et al. [14], Orda et al.
[37], Sorin and Wan [46], Mertikopoulos et al. [25], and references therein.
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2.2. Nash equilibrium. The most prevalent solution concept in game theory is that
of a Nash equilibrium (NE), defined here as any action profile xˆ ∈ X that is resilient
to unilateral deviations, i.e.,
ui(xˆi; xˆ−i) ≥ ui(xi; xˆ−i) for all xi ∈ Xi and all i ∈ N . (NE)
By the classical existence theorem of Debreu [12], concave games with compact
action spaces always admit a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, thanks to the individual
concavity of the game’s payoff functions, Nash equilibria can also be characterized
via the first-order optimality condition
〈vi(xˆ), xi − xˆi〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi, i ∈ N , (2.4)
where vi(x) denotes the individual payoff gradient of the i-th player, i.e.,
vi(x) = ∇xiui(xi;x−i), (2.5)
and ∇xi denotes differentiation with respect to the variable xi.5
Geometrically, this characterization of Nash equilibria simply means that vi(xˆ)
belongs to the polar cone
PCXi(xˆi) = {yi ∈ V∗i : 〈yi, xi − xˆi〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi}. (2.6)
of Xi at xˆi, i.e., vi(xˆ) forms an obtuse angle with any displacement vector of the form
zi = xi−xˆi, xi ∈ Xi. By concavity, this means that ui(xˆi+tzi; xˆ−i) is nonincreasing
in t, so (NE) holds for all xi ∈ Xi. We will use this geometric intuition freely in
what follows.
2.3. Variational inequalities and monotonicity. The first-order characterization (2.4)
of Nash equilibria can be written more concisely (but otherwise equivalently) as a
variational inequality of the form
〈v(xˆ), x− xˆ〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X (VI)
where
v(x) = (v1(x), . . . , vN (x)) (2.7)
denotes the players’ individual gradient profile at x ∈ X . As a result, finding a Nash
equilibrium of a concave game boils down to solving the (Stampacchia) variational
inequality problem (VI). This important observation has been the starting point
of an extensive literature at the interface of game theory and optimization; for an
overview, we refer the reader to Nikaido and Isoda [36], Facchinei and Pang [15],
Mertikopoulos and Zhou [30], and references therein.
Most of this literature has focused on problems where the vector field v(x) of
individual payoff gradients satisfies the monotonicity condition
〈v(x′)− v(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ 0 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (MC)
Owing to the link between (MC) and the theory of monotone operators in optimiza-
tion, games that satisfy (MC) are commonly referred to as monotone games.6 In
5We adopt here the established convention of treating vi(x) as an element of the dual space
V∗i of Vi. We do so in order to emphasize the fact that vi(x) acts naturally on vectors zi ∈ Vi via
the (linear) directional derivative mapping zi 7→ u′i(x; zi) = d/dt|t=0 ui(xi + tzi;x−i).
6Rosen [40] uses the name diagonal strict concavity (DSC) for a weighted variant of (MC)
which holds as a strict inequality when x′ 6= x. Hofbauer and Sandholm [20] use the term “stable”
to refer to a class of population games that satisfy a condition similar to (MC), while Sandholm
[42] and Sorin and Wan [46] respectively call such games “contractive” and “dissipative”. We use
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particular, mirroring the corresponding terminology from operator theory, we will
say that a game is:
a) Strictly monotone if (MC) holds as a strict inequality when x′ 6= x.
b) Strongly monotone if there exists a positive constant β > 0 such that
〈v(x′)− v(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ −β‖x′ − x‖2 for all x, x′ ∈ X . (2.8)
Obviously, we have the inclusions “strongly monotone” ( “strictly monotone” (
“monotone”, mirroring the corresponding chain of inclusions “strongly convex” (
“strictly convex” ( “convex” for convex functions.
The set of Nash equilibria of a monotone game – which coincides with the solution
set of (VI) – is itself convex and compact; in particular, if the game is strictly or
strongly monotone, its Nash set is a singleton. Moreover, on account of (MC), Nash
equilibria of monotone games can also be characterized in this case as solutions of
the Minty variational inequality
〈v(x), x − xˆ〉 ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X . (MVI)
This property of Nash equilibria of monotone games will play a crucial role in our
analysis and we will make free use of it in the rest of our paper; for a more detailed
discussion, we refer the reader to Mertikopoulos and Zhou [30].
In terms of applications, monotone games constitute a very rich and diverse class.
For instance, Examples 2.2 and 2.3 are both monotone (for a proof, see Nemirovski
et al. [32] and Bravo et al. [5]), as are Cournot oligopoly models (Monderer and Shap-
ley [31]), atomic splittable congestion games in networks with parallel links (Sorin
and Wan [46]), signal covariance optimization problems in wireless communications
(Mertikopoulos et al. [25]), and many other problems where online decision-making
is the norm. In particular, the class of monotone games contains all games that
admit a concave potential, i.e., a function f : X → R such that
vi(x) = ∇xif(x) for all x ∈ X , i ∈ N . (2.9)
In view of all this, monotone games will comprise a key part of our analysis, espe-
cially in the context of convergence to Nash equilibrium.
3. Problem setup
We now turn to a detailed description of our model for time-varying games. In
its most general form, this can be captured by the following sequence of events:
Time-varying games: sequence of events
Require: set of players i ∈ N, action spaces Xi ⊆ Rdi
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
2: set G ← Gt(N ,X , ut) # stage game
3: for all i ∈ N do
4: play Xti ∈ Xi # choose action
5: receive uti(X
t
i ;X
t
−i) # collect reward
6: get signal Y ti # receive feedback
7: end for
8: end for
the term “monotone” throughout to underline the connection of (MC) with operator theory and
variational inequalities.
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The core ingredients of the above framework are a) the sequence of games Gt,
t = 1, 2, . . . , encountered by the players at each stage; and b) the sequence of
feedback signals Y t. We discuss both in detail below.
3.1. The stage game sequence. Our standing assumptions for the sequence of stage
games Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) will be that a) each Gt is concave (in the sense of Sec-
tion 2.1); and b) only the players’ payoff functions evolve over time. Two important
special cases of this framework are when:
(1) There is a single player and the sequence of stage games is fixed in advance
(but is otherwise arbitrary). This unilateral framework is the gold standard
in online learning (cf. the various definitions of regret in the next section)
and is a priori oblivious, i.e., a different sequence of play would yield the
same sequence of payoff functions. This is because, in contrast to the
literature on stochastic games, the sequence Gt is typically assumed given
at the outset of the game – though it maybe unknown and/or otherwise
arbitrary.
(2) The sequence of stage games is constant, i.e., Gt = G for some fixed game G.
This case is the norm in game-theoretic learning and, besides comprising
several players, its principal difference with the online learning framework is
that the sequence of individual payoff functions faced by each player is not
oblivious. In general, given the dependence of the payoff function of player
i on the actions of all other players, a different sequence of actions Xt ≡
(Xti ;X
t
−i) would yield a different sequence of payoff functions ui(·, Xt−i).
In view of the above, a time-varying game can be seen as an amalgamation of
these two classical frameworks: in particular, the dependence of a player’s payoff
function on the stage index t is both explicit (via the sequence of stage games Gt
and implicit (via the sequence of actions chosen by all other players). This “dual”
dependence on t will play a key role in what follows, especially in the equilibrium
analysis of Section 7.
Remark 1. We should note here that the set of players N and their action spaces
Xi, i ∈ N , are tacitly assumed to remain unchanged for all t. However, this need
not be so: for instance, if the payoff function uti of some player i ∈ N is identically
equal to zero at stage t and the actions of player i have no impact on the payoff
function utj of any other player j ∈ N , the i-th player is effectively removed from
the game at stage t. As a result, the proposed time-varying game model is flexible
enough to account for games with a variable number of players, a case which has
significant interest for practical applications of game theory (e.g., in networks and
data science).7
In terms of regularity, we will be assuming throughout that the players’ individual
payoff gradients are uniformly bounded, i.e., there exists some finite Gi ≥ 0 such
that
‖vti(x)‖i,∗ ≤ Gi for all t = 1, 2, . . . , and all x ∈ X , (3.1)
where, in obvious notation, we have set
vti(x) = ∇xiuti(xi;x−i). (3.2)
7Similar devices can also account for action spaces that vary with time (at least, as long as
they are contained in some compact set).
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Other than that, we make no prior assumptions about the process that defines
each stage game. For instance, this evolution could be random (i.e., Gt could be
determined by some randomly drawn parameter θt), it could depend on the players’
actions (e.g., as in the literature on dynamic/repeated games), or any other mecha-
nism. Moreover, we do not assume that such information is available to the players:
from their individual viewpoint, each player is involved in a repeated decision pro-
cess where the choice of an action returns a reward, and they have no knowledge
of the mechanism generating this reward. The reason for this “agnostic” approach
is that, in many cases of practical interest, the standard rationality postulates (full
rationality, common knowledge of rationality, etc.) are not realistic: for example, a
commuter choosing a route to work has no way of knowing how many commuters
will be making the same choice, let alone how these choices might influence their
thinking for the next day.
3.2. Signals and feedback. The other basic ingredient of our model is the feedback
available to each player after choosing an action. In tune with the “bounded ratio-
nality” framework outlined above, we do not assume that players can observe the
actions of other players, their payoffs, or any other such information. Instead, we
take a “partial monitoring” approach as in Rustichini [41], Cesa-Bianchi et al. [9]
and Lugosi et al. [24], and we only posit that, at each stage t = 1, 2, . . . , every player
i ∈ N receives a (random) signal Y ti from some space containing payoff-relevant
information.
In particular, we will be assuming that the random signal received by player i
at stage t is of the general form
Y ti = v
t
i(X
t) + U ti , (3.3)
where Xt = (Xti ;X
t
−i) ∈ X is the profile of actions at stage t (possibly random),
and U ti is a stochastic perturbation of the realized payoff gradient, modeling ob-
servational noise in the feedback signal. As such, under this model, the signals of
player i ∈ N are drawn from the dual space Yi ≡ V∗i of the ambient space Vi of Xi.
Remark 2. In optimization-theoretic terms, the signal model (3.3) means that each
player has access to a (stochastic) first-order oracle, i.e., a black-box feedback mech-
anism providing (possibly noisy) gradient information at each stage. From a game-
theoretic standpoint, the motivation for this signal model is rooted in the case
where players can only observe their realized, in-game payoffs (the so-called ban-
dit setting). In this extremely low-information environment, it is still possible to
construct an oracle of the form (3.3) by means of a simultaneous perturbation sto-
chastic approximation (SPSA) procedure as in Spall [47], Flaxman et al. [16] and
Bravo et al. [5]; we defer the details of this analysis to a future paper.
In terms of measurability, it is tacitly assumed that both Xt = (Xti )i∈N and
Y t = (Y ti )i∈N are defined over a common (complete) probability space (Ω,F ,P),
and all expectations or probabilities will be taken with reference to this space. The
private history of player i is then defined as the filtration Fi = (F ti )∞t=0, where
F ti = σ(X1i , Y 1i , . . . , Xti , Y ti ) (3.4)
is the σ-algebra generated by the player’s chosen actions and signals received up to
stage t (inclusive), while F0i is chosen so as to complete the filtration (not necessarily
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in a trivial way). Aggregating over all players, the history of play is likewise defined
as the filtration F = (F t)∞t=0, where
F t = σ(X1, Y 1, . . . , Xt, Y t). (3.5)
Given all this, we posit that a player’s action at stage t+1 is determined by the
player’s private history up to stage t, i.e.,
Xt+1i = Algi(X
1
i , Y
1
i , . . . , X
t
i , Y
t
i ) (3.6)
for some measurable deterministic function Algi which will be referred to as an
algorithm (or repeated game strategy).8 This means that, for all t = 1, 2, . . . , Xt+1i
is F ti -predictable – or, collectively, that Xt+1 is F t-predictable.
In the rest of our paper, and unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, our blanket
assumptions for the signal process Y ti will be as follows:
(1) Y ti is a systematically unbiased estimate of v
t
i(X
t), i.e.,
E[Y ti | F t−1] = vti(Xt) (3.7a)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . and all i ∈ N .
(2) Y ti has uniformly bounded second-order moments, i.e.,
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | F t−1] ≤M2i (3.7b)
for some Mi <∞ and all t = 1, 2, . . . , i ∈ N .
Alternatively, the above is equivalent to asking that the noise process U ti is zero-
mean with finite mean square, i.e.,
E[U ti | F t−1] = 0 (3.8a)
and
E[‖U ti ‖2∗ | F t−1] ≤ σ2i (3.8b)
for some finite σi <∞ and all t = 1, 2, . . . , i ∈ N . Both of these assumptions can
be relaxed in various ways (e.g., by asking that Y ti is accurate on average only up
to some bias term, or by considering higher-order moments of U ti ), but it will be
more convenient to state our results with both these assumptions in play.
As a special case, the “noiseless” regime U ti = 0 will be sometimes referred to as
perfect information. However, to avoid clashes with existing terminology (especially
within the literature on dynamic and repeated games), we stress here that players
are never assumed to observe the actions of other players: even with “perfect”
information, only individual gradient observations are available at each stage.
4. Regret minimization
4.1. Types of regret. As we discussed in the introduction, a minimal worst-case
requirement for online decision-making is that of regret minimization. In the non-
stationary framework of the previous section, the regret of player i ∈ N relative to
a test action xi ∈ Xi over a window of play T ⊆ N is defined as
Regi(T ;xi) ≡
∑
t∈T
[uti(xi;X
t
−i)− uti(Xt)], (4.1)
8To avoid superfluous notation, we are omitting in (3.6) the dependence of X and Y on ω, and
we are treating Algi as a function of variable arity (so as to drop its dependence on t).
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and the agent’s static (or external) regret is defined as
Regi(T ) ≡ max
xi∈Xi
Regi(T ;xi) = max
xi∈Xi
∑
t∈T
[uti(xi;X
t
−i)− uti(Xt)], (4.2)
i.e., as the difference between the cumulative payoff of the focal player i ∈ N under
the sequence of play Xt ∈ X , t = 1, 2, . . . , and that of the player’s best fixed action
over the time window T .9 Then, specializing to the case where T = {1, . . . , T }, we
will say that the sequence Xt leads to no (static) regret if
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
Regi(T ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N , (4.3)
i.e., if every player’s regret grows at most sublinearly with the horizon of play:
Regi(T ) = o(T ) for all i ∈ N . (4.4)
By the individual concavity of the players’ payoff functions, the payoff difference
in the definition of the regret can be bounded from above as
uti(xi;X
t
−i)− uti(Xt) ≤ 〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉, (4.5)
for any reference action xi ∈ Xi and all t ∈ T . Consequently, a player’s regret can
be itself bounded from above as
Regi(T ) ≤ Gapi(T ), (4.6)
where
Gapi(T ) ≡ max
xi∈Xi
∑
t∈T
〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 (4.7)
represents a linearized, player-specific regret measure that we call the gap function
of player i. Hence, to achieve no regret, it suffices to design an algorithm guaran-
teeing that Gapi(T ) = o(T ) for every player i ∈ N . This linearization device has
been the starting point of most no-regret strategies in the literature (see e.g., Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi [8], Shalev-Shwartz [45], Mertikopoulos and Zhou [30], Nesterov
[35], Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [6], and references therein), and we will use it freely
in the rest of our paper.
Of course, an important limitation in the definition (4.2) of a player’s regret is
that it compares the sequence of accrued rewards to that of the best fixed action in
hindsight. Since the players’ payoff functions evolve over time, a player following a
policy satisfying (4.3) may still incur a substantial loss relative to a non-constant
sequence of actions. Thus, to get a finer performance benchmark, we consider
instead the dynamic regret of player i relative to a test sequence xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . ,
defined as
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≡
∑
t∈T
[uti(x
t
i;X
t
−i)− uti(Xt)]. (4.8)
Then, as in the static case, we say that a sequence of play Xt leads to no dynamic
regret relative to a test sequence xt ∈ X , t = 1, 2, . . . ,10 if
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N , (4.9)
9By “window” we refer here to an interval of successive positive integers, i.e., T is of the form
T = {a, a+ 1, . . . , b} for some a, b ∈ N. Unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, we will only work
with intervals of this type.
10Hall and Willett [18] and Jadbabaie et al. [21] instead use the term “comparator sequence”.
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i.e., if every player’s dynamic regret relative to xt grows at most sublinearly with
the horizon of play T .
As a special case, if xti = xi ∈ Xi for all t = 1, 2, . . . , we recover the static regret
metric (4.1). At the other end of the spectrum, if xti ∈ argmaxxi∈Xi uti(xi;Xt−i) is
a sequence of individual best responses to the realized sequence of play Xt−i of all
other players, we get
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) =
∑
t∈T
max
xi∈Xi
[uti(xi;X
t
−i)− uti(Xt)]. (4.10)
Comparing this expression to the definition (4.2) of the static regret of player i,
we see that the order of summation and maximization have been exchanged. In
this way, we recover the original definition of Besbes et al. [4], suitably extended
to our multi-agent setting: in the long run, under a policy leading to no dynamic
regret, each player’s accrued rewards are no worse than what the player would have
obtained by best-responding to the sequence of play of all other players.
4.2. Dynamic regret minimization. Our main goal in the rest of this section will be
to provide a a universal bound for the players’ dynamic regret relative to arbitrary
test sequences. To do so, we will again rely on the individual concavity of the
players’ payoff functions to write
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤
∑
t∈T
〈vti(Xt), xti −Xti 〉, (4.11)
just as in the static case. Then, motivated by the recent analysis of Besbes et al.
[4], we will decompose a player’s dynamic regret into two components: one driven
by the gap function (4.7) over smaller windows of play, and the other measuring
the variation of the test sequence xti over time, as defined below:
Definition 4.1. The variation of a test sequence xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , over the
window T ⊆ N is defined as
Vari(T ;xTi ) =
∑
t∈T
‖xt+1i − xti‖, (4.12)
with the convention that xt+1i = x
t
i if t = T .
To proceed with the decomposition outlined above, let Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi be a parti-
tion of the time window T = {1, . . . , T } into mi batches, each of size
∆i = ⌊T/mi⌋, (4.13)
with the possible exception of the last one (which might be smaller). We then have:
Lemma 4.2. The dynamic regret of the i-th player relative to a test sequence xti ∈ Xi,
t = 1, 2, . . . , satisfies
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤
mi∑
ℓ=1
Gapi(Ti,ℓ) +Gi∆iVar(T , xTi ). (4.14)
Proof. The proof is an elementary computation building on an idea of Besbes et al.
[4]. Indeed, dropping the player index i for notational clarity, individual concavity
yields
DynReg(T ;xT ) =
m∑
ℓ=1
DynReg(Tℓ;xTℓ) ≤
m∑
ℓ=1
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), xt −Xt〉. (4.15)
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Now, fixing a reference action pℓ ∈ X for each batch ℓ = 1, . . . ,m, let
Iℓ =
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), pℓ −Xt〉, (4.16a)
and
Jℓ =
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), xt − pℓ〉, (4.16b)
so that the linearized dynamic regret over each batch can be written as∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), xt −Xt〉 = Iℓ + Jℓ. (4.17)
To bound Iℓ, note that
Iℓ =
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), pℓ −Xt〉 ≤ max
x∈X
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), x−Xt〉 = Gap(Tℓ). (4.18)
Subsequently, to bound Jℓ, let pℓ be the first element of the test sequence x
t over
the ℓ-th batch Tℓ. Then,∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vt(Xt), xt − pℓ〉 ≤
∑
t∈Tℓ
‖vt(Xt)‖∗ · ‖xt − pℓ‖
≤ G
∑
t∈Tℓ
‖xt − pℓ‖
≤ G∆max
t∈Tℓ
‖xt − pℓ‖
≤ G∆
∑
t∈Tℓ
‖xt+1 − xt‖ = G∆Var(Tℓ;xTℓ), (4.19)
where we used Young’s inequality in the first line and the triangle inequality in the
last one. Our claim then follows by summing over each batch ℓ = 1, . . . ,m. 
Lemma 4.2 suggests that minimizing a player’s regret relative to a rapidly-
varying test sequence xti may be difficult (if not downright impossible). On the
other hand, if the test sequence under study is slowly-varying in the sense that
Var(T ;xT ) = o(T ), (4.20)
then it might be feasible to attain no (dynamic) regret by properly tweaking the
batch size ∆i in the regret decomposition (4.14).
This observation was the starting point of the analysis of Besbes et al. [4] who
proposed breaking the horizon of play into batches of a carefully chosen size, and
then running on each batch an algorithm that incurs low static regret (i.e., sublinear
relative to the size of the batch).11 In our game-theoretic setting, this boils down
to each player choosing a batch size ∆i and breaking play up into mi = ⌈T/∆i⌉
successive time windows Ti,1, . . . , Ti,mi , each of size ∆i (except possibly the last
one). Then, at every window Ti,ℓ, each player i ∈ N updates their actions following
an (as yet unspecified) algorithm Algi which is restarted every ∆i stages. Formally,
this restart procedure can be encoded in pseudocode form as follows:
11By contrast, Hall and Willett [18] and Shahrampour and Jadbabaie [44] do not employ a
restart procedure and instead specialize to gradient/mirror descent to obtain sublinear regret.
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Algorithm 1 Batch restart (player indices suppressed)
Require: Horizon T, batch size ∆, choice algorithm Alg as in (3.6)
1: set t← 1 # step counter
2: choose X1 ∈ X # initialization
3: repeat
4: set τ ← ⌊(t− 1)/∆⌋∆+ 1 # augment every ∆ stages
5: play Xt ∈ X # play chosen action
6: get signal Y t # receive feedback
7: set Xt+1 ← Alg(Xτ , Y τ , . . . , Xt, Y t) # update action
8: t← t+ 1 # next stage
9: until t > T # end play
In view of all this, if the restart frequency is chosen as a function of the variation
of the test sequence under study, we have:
Theorem 4.3. Consider a time-varying game Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut), t = 1, 2, . . . , and
let Algi be an algorithm of the general form (3.6) such that
E[Gapi(T )] ≤ Ci
√
T (4.21)
for some Ci > 0 and all time intervals T ⊆ N of length T . Suppose further that
xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , is a test sequence enjoying the variation bound
Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ VT , (4.22)
for some VT ≥ 1. Then, if Algi is rebooted every ∆i = ⌈(T/VT )2/3⌉ stages following
Algorithm 1, we have
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤ (2Ci + 3Gi)T 2/3(VT )1/3. (4.23)
In particular, if xti is slowly-varying (i.e., VT /T → 0 as T →∞), we have
lim sup
T→∞
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤ 0. (4.24)
Remark 3. In the above, expectations are taken with respect to the randomness of
the players’ signals (and induced action sequences).
Proof. Taking expectations on both sides of the bound (4.14) yields
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤
mi∑
ℓ=1
E[Gapi(Ti,ℓ)] +Gi∆iVar(T , xTi ), (4.25)
where mi = ⌈T/∆i⌉ is the number of restarts up to stage T (inclusive). Then, with
Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ VT and |Ti,ℓ| ≤ ∆i = ⌈(T/VT )2/3⌉, this bound becomes:
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi ] ≤ miCi
√
∆i +Gi∆iVT
≤ (T/∆i + 1)Ci
√
∆i +Gi∆iVT
≤ Ci[1 + T 2/3(VT )1/3 + (T/VT )1/3] +Gi[VT + T 2/3(VT )1/3]
≤ (3Ci + 2Gi)T 2/3(VT )1/3 (4.26)
where, in the last line, we used the fact that VT ≥ 1. 
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As in the work of Besbes et al. [4], Theorem 4.3 can be seen as a “meta-principle”
that allows players to leverage a policy with no static regret to obtain a policy with
no dynamic regret. In this way, it should be contrasted to the work of Hall and
Willett [18] and Shahrampour and Jadbabaie [44] who focus on a specific learning
policy based on mirror descent and circumvent the need for restarting by exploiting
its specific properties. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6.
5. Distributed learning
In this section we present a class of distributed learning algorithms based on
online mirror descent (OMD), a meta-algorithm which, together with the closely
related “follow the regularized leader” (FTRL) protocol, comprises one of the most
widely used algorithmic schemes for no-regret learning in online optimization – for
a partial survey, see Nemirovski and Yudin [34], Beck and Teboulle [3], Nemirovski
et al. [33], Teboulle [48], Chen and Teboulle [10], Nesterov [35], Shalev-Shwartz [45],
Mertikopoulos and Zhou [30], and references therein.
Viewed abstractly, the basic idea of mirror descent (or, in our case, “ascent”) is
as follows: if player i ∈ N plays xi ∈ Xi and receives the gradient signal yi ∈ Yi,
the algorithm generates a new action x+i by taking an “approximate gradient” step
from xi along yi. Formally, this can be written as
x+i = Pi(xi, γyi) (5.1)
where
(1) γ is a step-size parameter controlling the weight attributed to the signal yi.
(2) Pi : Xi×Yi → Xi is a “proximal mapping” (discussed in detail below) which
determines the exact way in which the step along yi is taken.
Remark 4. Because the prox-mapping Pi plays a defining role in the players’ action
selection process, and to avoid clashes between the term “descent” and the fact
that players are treated as maximizers in our setting, we will refer to (5.1) as a
prox-method (PM).
Now, given a convex subset C of some ambient vector space V ∼= Rd, the proto-
typical example of a prox-mapping is the Euclidean projector
P (x, y) = ΠC(x+ y) ≡ argmin
x′∈C
{‖x+ y − x′‖22}
= argmin
x′∈C
{〈y, x− x′〉+ 12‖x′ − x‖22} (5.2)
i.e., the closest-point projection of x + y onto C.12 Going beyond the Euclidean
case, the key novelty of prox-methods is to replace the distance term 12‖x′ − x‖22 in
(5.2) with a (possibly non-symmetric) “divergence” defined by means of a distance-
generating function (DGF) h : C → R, itself assumed to be continuous and K-
strongly convex, i.e.,
h(tx+ (1− t)x′) ≤ th(x) + (1− t)h(x′)− K
2
t(1 − t)‖x′ − x‖2 (5.3)
12Note here that, in writing x+ y, we are blurring the lines between primal vectors x ∈ V and
dual vectors y ∈ V∗. This distinction is reinstated in the second line of (5.2) where y ∈ V∗ is
paired properly to x− x′ ∈ V .
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for all x, x′ ∈ C and all t ∈ [0, 1]. For technical reasons (and in a slight abuse of nota-
tion), we further assume that the subdifferential ∂h(x) = {y ∈ V∗ : h(x′) ≥ h(x) + 〈y, x′ − x〉}
of h admits a continuous selection: specifically, letting
C◦ ≡ dom ∂h = {x ∈ C : ∂h(x) 6= ∅} (5.4)
denote the domain of subdifferentiability of h, we posit that there exists a continu-
ous function ∇h : C◦ → V∗ such that ∇h(x) ∈ ∂h(x) for all x ∈ C◦.13 The Bregman
divergence induced by h is then defined as
Dh(x
′, x) = h(x′)− h(x)− 〈∇h(x), x′ − x〉 for all x′ ∈ C, x ∈ C◦, (5.5)
and the associated prox-mapping P : C × V∗ → C is given by
P (x, y) = argmin
x′∈C
{〈y, x− x′〉+Dh(x′, x)} for all x ∈ C◦, y ∈ V∗. (5.6)
Before continuing, it will be instructive to provide some standard examples of
prox-mappings:
Example 5.1 (Euclidean projections). We begin by recovering the archetypal exam-
ple of Euclidean projections. To do so, let h(x) = 12‖x‖2. Since h is subdifferentiable
throughout C, we have C◦ = C; moreover, ∇h(x) = x is a continuous selection of
∂h(x) for all x ∈ C. Hence, the associated Bregman divergence is
Dh(x
′, x) = 12‖x′‖22 − 12‖x‖22 − 〈x, x′ − x〉 = 12‖x′ − x‖22, (5.7)
and the induced prox-mapping is given by (5.2) for all x ∈ C, y ∈ V∗.
Example 5.2 (Entropic regularization). Let C = {x ∈ Rd+ :
∑d
j=1 xj = 1} denote
the unit simplex of V = Rd. A very widely used distance-generating function for
this geometry is the (negative) Gibbs-Shannon entropy h(x) =
∑d
j=1 xj log xj . By
inspection, the domain of (sub)differentiability of h is C◦ = riC, and the resulting
Bregman divergence is given by the Kullback–Leibler (KL) expression
Dh(x
′, x) =
d∑
j=1
x′j log
(
x′j
xj
)
, (5.8)
valid for all x ∈ C◦, x′ ∈ C. In turn, this gives rise to the prox-mapping
P (x, y) =
(xj exp(−yj))dj=1∑d
j=1 xj exp(−yj)
(5.9)
for all x ∈ C◦, y ∈ V∗. The update rule x+ = P (x, y) is widely known in the
literature as the multiplicative weights (MW) algorithm and plays a central role for
learning in multi-armed bandit problems and finite games. For a survey, see Freund
and Schapire [17], Arora et al. [1], Cohen et al. [11], Palaiopanos et al. [38], and
references therein.
13By standard results in convex analysis [39], we have ri C ⊆ C◦ ⊆ C. Note also that we are
making use of the standard convention that h(x) = +∞ if x ∈ V \ {C}.
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Example 5.3 (Fermi-Dirac regularization). Let C = [0, 1] and let h(x) = x log(x) +
(1− x) log(1− x) be the (negative) Fermi-Dirac entropy. Then, C◦ = (0, 1) and the
induced prox-mapping is given by the expression
P (x, y) =
x exp(−y)
1− x+ x exp(−y) , (5.10)
valid for all x ∈ (0, 1), y ∈ R.
With all this at hand, the general class of game-theoretic learning algorithms
that we will consider will be given by the recursion
Xt+1i = Pi(X
t
i , γ
t
iY
t
i ) (5.11)
where, in more detail:
1. t = 1, 2, . . . denotes the stage of the process.
2. Xti ∈ Xi is the action played by player i at stage t.
3. Y ti ∈ Yi is the signal received by player i at stage t, assumed throughout to
satisfy the unbiasedness assumption E[Y ti | F t−1] = vti(Xt) (cf. Section 3).
4. γti is a player-specific step-size sequence (assumed nonincreasing).
5. Pi : Xi × Yi → Xi denotes the prox-mapping of player i, itself derived from
some distance-generating function hi : Xi → R as above.
In particular, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, all repeated game strategies
described in Section 3 will be henceforth assumed to be of the (Markovian) form
Algi(X
1
i , Y
1
i , . . . , X
t
i , Y
t
i ) = Pi(X
t
i , γ
t
iY
t
i ). (5.12)
For concreteness, we also provide a pseudocode implementation of this prox-based
learning protocol as Algorithm 2 below:
Algorithm 2 Prox-method for distributed learning (player indices suppressed)
Require: prox-mapping P : X × Y → X, step-size sequence γt ≥ 0,
sequence of stage games Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut)
1: initialize X1 = argminx∈X h(x) # initialization
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
3: set G ← Gt(N ,X , ut) # stage game definition
4: play Xt ∈ X # play chosen action
5: get signal Y t ∈ Y # receive feedback
6: set Xt+1 ← P (Xt, γtY t) # update action
7: t← t+ 1 # next stage
8: end for
6. Explicit regret bounds
We show in this section how Theorem 4.3 can be applied in the specific case
where each player adheres to the prox-method described in the previous section.
To that end, suppose that the players face a sequence of games Gt, t = 1, 2, . . . , and
seek to minimize their regret following Algorithm 2. Following the meta-principle
outlined in Section 4, our dynamic regret analysis begins with a basic inequality
bounding the static regret of any fixed action over a finite horizon of play:
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Proposition 6.1. Let Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) be a sequence of concave games. Assume
further that Algorithm 2 is initialized at pi ≡ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi) and run with step-
size γi. Then, the regret incurred by player i relative to a fixed test action xi ∈ Xi
over the window of play T = {1, . . . , T } enjoys the bound
Regi(T ;xi) ≤
D[Xi, hi]
γi
+
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , Xti − xi〉+
γi
2Ki
T∑
t=1
‖Y ti ‖2∗, (6.1)
with D[Xi, hi] = maxhi −minhi.
Results of this flavor are fairly well known in the online learning literature; still,
for the sake of completeness, we present a quick proof below.
Proof of Proposition 6.1. The basic starting point of our analysis is the following
inequality, taken from Eq. (A.19) in Appendix A:
Dhi(xi, X
t+1
i )−Dhi(xi, Xti ) ≤ −〈γtiY ti , xi −Xti 〉+
(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗. (6.2)
Using the decomposition of the signal at stage t and rearranging the above expres-
sion yields
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )
− 〈γtiU ti , xi −Xti 〉+
(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗. (6.3)
Taking a constant step-size γti = γi and telescoping gives
T∑
t=1
〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤
1
γi
(
Dhi(xi, X
1
i )−Dhi(xi, XT+1i )
)
−
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , xi −Xti 〉+
T∑
t=1
γi
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗. (6.4)
Since X1i = argminxi∈Xi hi(xi) and the Bregman divergence is non-negative, we
then get
T∑
t=1
〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤
1
γi
Dhi(xi, X
1
i ) +
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , Xti − xi〉+
T∑
t=1
γi
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗
≤ 1
γi
D[Xi, hi] +
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , Xti − xi〉+
T∑
t=1
γi
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗ (6.5)
where, in the last line, we used the Bregman divergence bound (A.4) derived in
Appendix A. 
Proposition 6.1 is the main stepping stone towards obtaining a static regret
bound that holds in expectation; we provide the details for this derivation in the next
section. Beyond this basic bound, it is possible to use Markov’s inequality to obtain
a bound that holds with high probability; however, as we show in Section 6.2, it is
possible to prove a much tighter large deviation principle for the algorithm’s static
regret by using a series of exponential concentration arguments for martingales.
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6.1. Bounding the expected static regret. In order to bound the static regret of
Algorithm 2, we recall the basic assumptions we imposed on the observational
noise of the players’ feedback signal. First, by combining Eqs. (3.1) and (3.8b) and
letting M2i = 2G
2
i + 2σ
2
i , we readily get
E[‖Y ti ‖∗ | F t−1] ≤M2i for all t = 1, 2, . . . (6.6)
Under these assumptions, we have:
Proposition 6.2. Suppose that Algorithm 2 is run with assumptions as in Proposi-
tion 6.1 and step-size
γi = 2
√
D[Xi;hi]Ki
T (M2i + σ
2
i )
. (6.7)
We then have the following regret bound over the time window T = {1, . . . , T }:
E[Regi(T )] ≤ 2
√
T (M2i + σ
2
i )D[Xi;hi]/Ki. (6.8)
In particular, lim supT→∞ E[Regi(T )/T ] = 0.
Remark 5. Before proving Proposition 6.2, it is worth noting that (6.8) is an upper
bound on the expected regret of Algorithm 2, not the algorithm’s pseudo-regret
PRegi(T ) = max
xi∈Xi
E[Regi(T ;xi)]. (6.9)
Bounding this latter, weaker notion of regret is more common in the online learning
literature (see e.g., Bubeck and Cesa-Bianchi [6] and references therein) because the
expectation in (6.9) is taken over a fixed action (as opposed to the best possible
action in hindsight); as such, the pseudo-regret is considerably easier to treat than
the actual, expected regret. Moreover, by Jensen’s inequality, a bound on the
expected regret can be automatically translated to a bound on the pseudo-regret,
so Proposition 6.2 serves a dual purpose in this regard.
Proof of Proposition 6.2. By the bound (6.3), we have
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )
− 〈γtiU ti , xi −Xti 〉+
(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗. (6.10)
For each player i define the auxiliary process {Zti}t∈N by
Z1i = X
1
i and Z
t+1
i = Pi(Z
t
i , γ
t
iU
t
i ). (6.11)
A simple induction argument shows that the process {Zti}t≥1 is {F ti }t≥1 measurable,
for all i ∈ N . Using this process, the previous inequality can be rewritten as
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, Xti )−Dhi(xi, Xt+1i )
− 〈γtiU ti , Zti −Xti 〉+
(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 〈γtiU ti , Zti − xi〉. (6.12)
Hence, after summing and telescoping, we arrive at the bound
T∑
t=1
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, X1)−Dhi(xi, XT+1i ) +
T∑
t=1
〈γtiU ti , Xti − Zti 〉
+
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗ +
T∑
t=1
〈γtiU ti , Zti − xi〉. (6.13)
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Lemma A.2, proven in Appendix A, shows that
T∑
t=1
〈γtiU ti , Zti − xi〉 ≤ Dhi(xi, X1i ) +
1
2Ki
T∑
t=1
‖γtiU ti ‖2∗. (6.14)
Combining these two inequalities gives
T∑
t=1
〈γtivti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤ 2Dhi(xi, X1i ) +
T∑
t=1
〈γtiU ti , Xti − Zti 〉
+
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
2Ki
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
. (6.15)
In the case of a constant step-size γti = γi, this implies
T∑
t=1
〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤
2Dhi(xi, X
1
i )
γi
+
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , Xti − Zti 〉+
γi
2Ki
T∑
t=1
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
.
(6.16)
Since X1i ∈ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi), taking the supremum over actions xi ∈ Xi on both
sides of this inequality and using (4.7), we conclude
Regi(T ) ≤ Gapi(T ) ≤
2
γi
D[Xi, hi] +
T∑
t=1
〈U ti , Xti − Zti 〉+
T∑
t=1
γi
2Ki
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
.
(6.17)
The process
∑T
t=1〈U ti , Xti − Zti 〉 is a martingale with respect to the filtration F :=
{Ft}t≥1, which is also bounded in L2(Ω,F ,F,P), thanks to (6.26). The pro-
cess
∑T
t=1
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
is a non-negative submartingale, with expected value
bounded by T (M2i + σ
2
i ). Hence, taking expectations on both sides, we obtain
E[Regi(T )] ≤ E[Gapi(T )] ≤
2
γi
D[Xi, hi] + Tγi
2Ki
(M2i + σ
2
i ). (6.18)
Optimizing with respect to γi yields the step-size expression (6.7). We thus get
E[Regi(T )] ≤ E[Gapi(T )] ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]T (M2i + σ2i )/Ki, (6.19)
and our proof is complete. 
We close this section by noting that, when the feedback signal is deterministic,
Proposition 6.2 immediately delivers a deterministic O(T 1/2) regret bound:
Corollary 6.3. Suppose that Algorithm 2 is run with assumptions as in Proposi-
tion 6.2 and perfect gradient observations (σ = 0). We then have
Regi(T ) ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]TM2i /Ki. (6.20)
In particular, lim supT→∞Regi(T )/T = 0 for all i ∈ N .
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6.2. Bounding the static regret with high probability. The analysis of the previous
section provides bounds on the expected regret of Algorithm 2. However, in many
real-world applications, a player typically only gets a single realization of their
strategy, so it is important to have bounds that hold, not only on average, but also
with high probability. Based on Proposition 6.2, a simple Markov bound on the
magnitude of the realized regret readily yields
P(Regi(T ) ≥ εT ) ≤
1
Tε
E[Regi(T )] ≤
2
ε
√
D[Xi, hi](M2i + σ2i )
KiT
. (6.21)
However, the Θ(1/ε) tails of this distribution are both heavy and long, implying
in turn that there is significant probability of incurring regret that is order of
magnitudes higher than the bound (6.8) would indicate. To counter this, we provide
below a large deviations principle which shows that the agent’s realized regret is
exponentially unlikely to significantly exceed the mean bound (6.8).
To do so, we will need to slightly strengthen the finite mean square hypothesis
(3.8b) and posit that there exists a constant M∗ > 0 such that
E
[
exp
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗
M2∗
)]
≤ exp(1) for all t = 1, 2, . . . , i ∈ N . (6.22)
This “ψ2-type” bound has a long history in the optimization literature (see e.g.,
Nemirovski et al. [33], Juditsky et al. [22] and references therein) and, essentially, it
means that the distribution of the feedback signal sequence Y t is (uniformly) sub-
Gaussian. As such, it holds under standard Gaussian observation noise sequences,
Rademacher-distributed errors, and all noise distributions with bounded support.
We also note that (6.22) implies that the observational noise has finite moments of
all orders, so it is stronger than (3.7b).
Clearly, this assumption on the feedback imposes a similar structure on the
observational noise process U t. Indeed, by definition, we have
‖U ti ‖2∗ = ‖Y ti − vti(Xt)‖2∗ ≤ 2‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2‖vti(Xt)‖2∗. (6.23)
Since
‖vti(Xt)‖∗ = ‖E[Y ti | Fˆt]‖∗ ≤
√
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | Fˆt] ≤M∗, (6.24)
we conclude that
‖U ti ‖2∗ ≤ 2‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2M2∗ , (6.25)
and hence
E
[
exp
(
‖U ti ‖2∗
4M2∗
)]
≤ exp(1). (6.26)
These bounds can be used to derive an exponential concentration inequality for
the realized regret of Algorithm 2 as follows:
Proposition 6.4. Fix a tolerance level ε ∈ (0, 1) and a horizon of play T ≥ 1. Sup-
pose further that (6.22) holds and Algorithm 2 is initialized at pi ≡ argminxi∈Xi hi(xi)
and run with step-size
γi =
√
2D[Xi, hi]
Ωi(ε)T
, (6.27)
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where Ωi(ε) = 5(1+ log(2/ε))M
2
∗/(2Ki). Then, the incurred regret of player i ∈ N
enjoys the bound
Regi(T ) ≤ 2
√
2D[Xi;hi]Ωi(ε)T + 8M∗
√
2K−1i D[Xi, hi] log(2/ε)T, (6.28)
with probability at least 1− ε. Thus, in the limit ε→ 0, T →∞, we have
Regi(T ) = O(
√
log(1/ε)T ) with probability at least 1− ε. (6.29)
Since the proof of Proposition 6.4 is fairly technical, we relegate it to Appendix B.
What is more important for our purposes is to contrast the bound (6.28) with the
Markov bound (6.21). Indeed, inverting (6.28), it follows that there exists some
constant α > 0 such that
P(Regi(T ) ≥ εT ) ≤ exp(−εT/α). (6.30)
Compared to (6.21), this shows that the probability of incurring high regret under
(6.22) is exponentially small in both ε and T . This represents a considerable reduc-
tion from the ε−1T−1/2 dependence of the bound (6.21) and shows that, under the
sub-Gaussian noise assumption (6.22), “black swan” realizations with significantly
high regret are exponentially rare.
6.3. Bounding the expected dynamic regret. With all this groundwork at hand, we
are in a position to derive a bound for the players’ expected dynamic regret via
the meta-prinicple provided by Theorem 4.3. To do so, the required ingredients are
(i) the restart procedure of Besbes et al. [4] (cf. Algorithm 1); and (ii) an algorithm
guaranteeing sublinear asymptotic behavior of the gap function. In this section we
carry out this program, using Algorithm 2 as the driving subroutine for updating
the players’ decisions between restarts.
To make all this precise, suppose that each player breaks up the window of play
T = {1, . . . , T } into blocks Ti,1, Ti,2, . . . , each of size ∆i (except possibly the last
one). We then have:
Proposition 6.5. Let xti ∈ Xi, t = 1, 2, . . . , be a test sequence enjoying the variation
bound
Vari(T ;xTi ) ≤ VT (6.31)
for some VT ≥ 1. Suppose further that Algorithm 1 is run with batch size ∆i =
⌈(T/VT )2/3⌉ and, within each block, Algorithm 2 is run with step-size
γi = 2
√
KiD[Xi, hi]
∆i(M2i + σ
2
i )
. (6.32)
Then, the dynamic regret incurred by player i ∈ N enjoys the bound
E[DynRegi(T , xTi )] ≤ (3Ci + 2Gi)T 2/3V 1/3T , (6.33)
where Ci = 2
√D[Xi, hi](M2i + σ2i )Ki.
Proof. By Lemma 4.2, we can bound the dynamic regret incurred by player i against
xti as
DynRegi(T ;xTi ) ≤
mi∑
ℓ=1
Gapi(Ti,ℓ) +Gi∆iVari(T ;xTi ), (6.34)
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where mi = ⌈T/∆i⌉ is the number of blocks in the partition of T . By the bound
(6.19) in the proof of Proposition 6.2, we can further bound the gap function of
player i over the ℓ-th batch as
E[Gapi(Ti,ℓ)] ≤ 2
√
D[Xi, hi]∆i(M2i + σ2i )/Ki. (6.35)
Hence, summing the bounds of the gap function over each block, we can bound the
player’s expected dynamic regret as
E[DynRegi(T ;xTi )] ≤ 2mi
√
D[Xi, hi]∆i(M2i + σ2i )/Ki +Gi∆iVT . (6.36)
Our claim then follows in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
In closing this section, there are two points worth noting. First, by following
the large deviations analysis of Section 6.2, it is possible to show that the players’
dynamic regret is exponentially unlikely to exceed the bound (6.33). However,
because of the required restart procedure, the corresponding exact expressions end
up being considerably cumbersome to derive (and of comparably little interest), so
we omit them.
Second, we should contrast the O(T 2/3V 1/3T ) bound (6.33) to the corresponding
O(T 1/2V 1/2T ) bound of Hall and Willett [18] and Shahrampour and Jadbabaie [44]
for mirror descent without restarting. Ignoring the fact that the latter bounds
require perfect gradient observations, their main advantage lies in their better de-
pendence on the horizon of play T . In particular, these bounds capture the (min-
max optimal) O(T 1/2) rate of regret minimization for static comparator sequences
(by contrast, restarting would only provide a O(T 2/3) regret minimization rate in
the static case). At the same time however, the O(T 2/3V 1/3T ) bound provided the
restart heuristic carries a better dependence on the variation VT of the chosen test
sequence; as such, it is more adapted to highly dynamic environments where the
chosen comparator sequence may be rapidly varying. This observation will play an
important role in the game-theoretic analysis of the next section.
7. Regret minimization and Nash equilibrium
In this section, we examine the equilibrium convergence properties of the players’
long-run behavior in two distinct regimes: a) when the sequence of stage games Gt
encountered by the players evolves over time without converging; and b) when Gt
converges to some limit game G. In both cases, we will treat the process defining
the time-varying game as a “black box” and we will not scruitinize its origins in
detail; we do so in order to focus directly on the interplay between the fluctuations
of the stage game and the induced sequence of play.
7.1. Tracking Nash equilibria. We begin by considering the case where Gt evolves
without converging. Building on the discussion in Section 2, we will assume in what
follows that each Gt is β-strongly monotone in the sense of (2.8), i.e.,
〈vt(x′)− vt(x), x′ − x〉 ≤ −β‖x′ − x‖2 (7.1)
for all t = 1, 2, . . . , and all x, x′ ∈ X . In particular, this implies that each stage
game Gt admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which we will denote by xˆt. Then, to
quantify the degree to which the players’ chosen actions Xt ∈ X “track” the Nash
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equilibrium sequence xˆt over the window of play T ⊆ N, we will use the error
function
erri(T ) =
∑
t∈T
‖Xti − xˆti‖2, (7.2)
or, aggregating over all players i ∈ N ,
err(T ) =
∑
i∈N
erri(T ) =
∑
t∈T
‖Xt − xˆt‖2. (7.3)
By construction, if this error function grows sublinearly with the size T = |T | of
the window of play, the sequence Xt will be close to Nash equilibrium for most of
the time (as determined by the asymptotic growth of err(T ) over time).
Of course, if the sequence of Nash equilibria varies arbitrarily from one stage
to the next, there is no way of achieving err(T ) = o(T ).14 For this reason, we
will focus in what follows on time-varying games with slowly-varying equilibria, i.e.,
such that
T−1∑
t=1
‖xˆt+1 − xˆt‖ = o(T ) as T →∞. (7.4)
Under this assumption we have:
Theorem 7.1. Let Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) be a sequence of strongly monotone games. As-
sume further that the variation of each the game’s Nash equilibria over the window
of play T = {1, . . . , T } satisfies ∑T−1t=1 ‖xˆt+1 − xˆt‖ ≤ VT for some VT > 0. Then, if
players follow Algorithm 2 for batches of size ∆ = ⌈(T/VT )2/3⌉ (as per Algorithm 1)
with step-size given by (6.32), we have
E[erri(T )] = O(T 2/3V 1/3T ) (7.5)
for all i ∈ N . In particular, if the sequence of stage equilibria is slowly-varying in
the sense of (7.4), we have E[err(T )] = o(T ) as T →∞.
Proof. Our proof strategy will be to leverage the dynamic regret minimization
properties of the restart schedule of Algorithm 1 (cf. Theorem 4.3). To that end,
note first that, for every reference action pi ∈ Xi, strong monotonicity yields
β‖Xti − xˆti‖2 ≤ 〈vti(Xt), xˆti −Xti 〉
≤ 〈vti(Xt), pi −Xti 〉+ 〈vti(Xt), xˆti − pi〉. (7.6)
Now, letting Tℓ be a batch of size at most ∆ = ⌈(T/VT )2/3⌉ (as per the restart
schedule of Algorithm 1), we obtain the local error bound∑
t∈Tℓ
β‖Xti − xˆti‖2 ≤
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vti(Xt), pi −Xti 〉+
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vti(Xt), xˆti − pi〉
≤ Gapi(Tℓ) +
∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vti(Xt), xˆti − pi〉. (7.7)
Hence, writing τℓ = min{t : t ∈ Tℓ} for the first index of batch Tℓ and taking
pi = xˆ
τℓ
i as a reference action for the ℓ-th batch, we can bound the second term
above as ∑
t∈Tℓ
〈vti(Xt), xˆti − pi〉 ≤ Gi|Tℓ|max
t∈Tℓ
‖xˆti − xˆτℓi ‖
14For a rigorous statement and proof in the single-player setting, see the recent paper [4].
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≤ Gi∆Var(Tℓ, xˆτℓi ). (7.8)
Then, taking expectations and summing over all batches as in the proof of Lemma 4.2,
we get
E
[
T∑
t=1
‖Xti − xˆti‖2
]
≤ 1
β
m∑
ℓ=1
E[Gapi(Tℓ)] +
Gi
β
∆VT , (7.9)
By Proposition 6.2, we have Gapi(Tℓ) = O(∆1/2). Thus, with ∆ = O((T/VT )2/3)
and m = O(T/∆) = O(T 1/3V 2/3T ), we finally get
E[erri(T )] = O(m∆) +O(∆VT ) = O(T 1/3V 2/3T · T 1/3V −1/3T ) +O((T/VT )2/3 · VT )
= O(T 2/3V 1/3T ), (7.10)
as claimed. Finally, our last assertion follows by noting that T 2/3V
1/3
T = o(T ) if
VT = o(T ). 
Note that the strategy used to bound the tracking error depends on the vari-
ation of the sequence of Nash equilibria of each stage game Gt. We emphasize
that this does not mean that the players actually know the precise variation: it
suffices to have an upper bound thereof (even a pessimistic one). For instance, such
information could be available to a player who knows that the sequence of stage
games encountered comes from a family of games that follow some sufficiently slow
variation, but they do not the exact realization of the game at each stage. It thus
stands to reason that a sharper bound of this form leads to a better tracking error
(as evidenced by the V
1/3
T dependence of err(T ) on the variation bound VT ).
7.2. Convergence to Nash equilibrium. We now turn to the case where the sequence
of stage games Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) converges to some (monotone) limit game G ≡
G(N ,X , u).15 Formally, it will be convenient to characterize this convergence in
terms of the quantity
Bti = max
x∈X
‖vti(x)− vi(x)‖∗, (7.11)
i.e., via the maximum difference in (individual) payoff gradients between stage t
and the limit t → ∞. We will then say that the sequence of games Gt converges
effectively to G if
Bt ≡
∑
i∈N
Bti → 0 as t→ 0. (7.12)
The reason for defining the convergence of a sequence of games in terms of payoff
gradients instead of payoff functions is twofold: First, if the payoff functions of a
game are perturbed by arbitrary (player-specific) constants, the game’s equilibrium
points will remain unchanged, but the corresponding payoff differences may be large
(so ‖uti − ui‖ may fail to converge to 0 as t → ∞). Second, Eq. (2.4) shows that
the Nash equilibria of a (concave) game can be seen as solution of a variational
inequality that only involves the players’ individual payoff gradients – not their
payoff functions. As such, characterizing the convergence of a sequence of stage
games in terms of payoff gradients is closer to the true primitives that define the
players’ equilibrium behavior.
15To be clear, we are not assuming that each stage game Gt is a priori monotone.
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Now, as in the previous section, we will focus on the prox-based learning protocol
outlined in Algorithm 2. However, since we are now interested in the convergence
of the generated sequence of play to a specific target point in X , we will require in
what follows that the Bregman divergence of h =
∑
i hi satsify the condition
xt → p whenever Dh(p, xt)→ 0, (7.13)
for every sequence of actions xt ∈ X ◦ ≡ ∏iX ◦i . This requirement is known in
the literature as “Bregman reciprocity” and it is fairly standard in the “last iterate”
analysis of mirror descent algorithms – see e.g., Chen and Teboulle [10], ? [? ],
Mertikopoulos and Staudigl [27], and references therein. Heuristically, it simply
ensures that the sublevel sets of Dh(p, ·) constitute a neighborhood basis for p in X ,
i.e., every Bregman zone of the form Dε(p) ≡ {x ∈ X : Dh(p, x) ≤ ε} contains some
δ-ball Bδ(p) = {x ∈ X : ‖p − x‖ ≤ δ}. The converse to this condition (i.e., that
Xt → p whenever Dh(p,Xt) → 0) holds automatically as a simple consequence of
the fact that Dh(p, x) ≥ (K/2)‖p − x‖2 (cf. Appendix A). Thus, taken together,
Bregman reciprocity guarantees that xt → p if and only if Dh(p, xt)→ 0.
With all this at hand, we obtain the following equilibrium convergence result:
Theorem 7.2. Let Gt ≡ Gt(N ,X , ut) be a sequence of concave games converging to
a strictly monotone limit game G ≡ G(N ,X , u) in the sense of (7.12). Assume
further that each player follows Algorithm 2 with a prox-mapping satisfying (7.13)
and a step-size sequence γt such that
∞∑
t=1
γt =∞,
∞∑
t=1
(γt)2 <∞, and
∞∑
t=1
γtBt <∞. (7.14)
Then, with probability 1, the sequence of realized actions Xt converges to the (nec-
essarily unique) Nash equilibrium xˆ of the limit game G.
Before discussing the proof of Theorem 7.2, some remarks are in order: First,
the requirement
∑∞
t=1 γ
tBt < ∞ should be interpreted as a bound on how slow
the convergence of Gt can be in order to guarantee convergence to equilibrium. For
instance, as long as Bt = O(1/(log t)ε) for some ε > 0, the step-size conditions
(7.27) can all be satisfied by taking γt ∝ 1/(t log t). Second, as in Theorem 7.1, the
players of the game are not required to know the exact value of Bt (which would
require a very detailed knowledge of the game at hand): as in all our results so far,
it suffices to work with an upper bound thereof (even a loose, pessimistic one).
Our proof strategy will be based on two intermediate results, both of independent
interest. First, we will show that the sequence of generated actions converges (a.s.)
to a level set of the Bregman divergence Dh(xˆ, ·) relative to xˆ. Subsequently, we
show that Xt cannot remain a bounded distance away from xˆ for all sufficiently
large t. Combining these results will then suffice to show that Xt can only converge
to the zero-level set of the Bregman divergence, i.e., limt→∞X
t = xˆ.
We begin by establishing the convergence of Xt to a level set of the Bregman
divergence:
Proposition 7.3. With assumptions as in Theorem 7.2, the Bregman divergence
Dh(xˆ, X
t) converges (a.s.) to a random variable D∞ with P(D∞ <∞) = 1.
Proof. To begin, it will be convenient to decompose the signal process Y ti as
Y ti = v
t
i(X
t) + U ti = vi(X
t) + U ti + b
t
i, (7.15)
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where we have set bti = v
t
i(X
t) − vi(Xt). Then, letting Dti = Dhi(xˆi, Xti ), the
descent inequality (6.3) for the Bregman divergence readily yields
Dt+1i ≤ Dti + γt〈Y ti , Xti − xˆi〉+
(γt)2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗
≤ Dti + γtξti + γtβti +
(γt)2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗, (7.16)
where, in the second line, we have set ξti = 〈U ti , Xti − xˆi〉 and βti = 〈bti, Xti − xˆi〉, and
we used the fact that xˆ is a Nash equilibrium of the limit game G (implying in turn
that 〈v(xi), xi − xˆi〉 ≤ 0 for all xi ∈ Xi and all i ∈ N ). Thus, taking expectations,
we obtain:
E[Dt+1i | F t−1] ≤ E
[
Dti + ξ
t
i + β
t
i +
(γt)2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖2∗
∣∣∣∣F t−1
]
≤ Dti + γt E[‖bti‖∗‖Xti − xˆi‖ | F t−1] +
(γt)2
2K
E[‖Y ti ‖2∗ | F t−1]
≤ Dti + γtBti diam(Xi) +
1
2K
(γt)2M2i (7.17)
where a) in the second line, we used the fact that Xt is predictable relative to F t,
the definition of βti , and the fact that E[U
t | F t−1] = 0; and b) in the last line, we
used (3.7b) and the definition of Bti .
To proceed, let εti = γ
tBti , so the last line of (7.17) can be written as
E[Dt+1 | F t−1] ≤ Dti + εti. (7.18)
Consider now the auxiliary process ζti = D
t+1
i +
∑∞
s=t+1 ε
s
i . Then, taking expecta-
tions yields
E[ζti | F t−1] ≤ Dti + εti +
∞∑
s=t+1
εsi = D
t
i +
∞∑
s=t
εsi = ζ
t−1
i , (7.19)
i.e., ζti is a supermartingale relative to F t. Furthermore, since
∑∞
t=1 ε
t
i <∞ by the
step-size assumption (7.27), we also get E[ζti ] ≤ E[ζ1i ] <∞, i.e., ζti is bounded in L1.
Thus, by Doob’s (sub)martingale convergence theorem, it follows that ζti converges
almost surely to some random variable ζi that is itself finite (almost surely and in
L1). Since Dti = ζ
t−1
i −
∑∞
s=t ε
s
i and limt→∞
∑∞
s=t ε
s
i = 0 (again, by the step-size
summability assumption), we conclude that Dti converges itself to ζi. Our claim
then follows by noting that Dh(xˆ, X
t) =
∑
iDhi(xˆi, X
t
i ). 
Moving on, our next result shows that the sequence of play Xt gets arbitrarily
close to the Nash equilibrium xˆ of the limit game:
Proposition 7.4. With probability 1, there exists a (random) subsequence Xtk of Xt
which converges to xˆ.
Proof. Our proof is by contradiction. To that end, suppose that, with positive
probability, the sequence of play Xt does not admit xˆ as a limit point. Conditioning
on this event, there exists a ball Bδ(xˆ) such that X
t /∈ Bδ(xˆ) for all sufficiently large
t, implying in turn thatXt is contained in some compact set K ⊆ X such that xˆ 6∈ K.
By (2.4), we have 〈v(x), x − xˆ〉 < 0 whenever x ∈ K. Therefore, by the continuity
of v and the compactness of K, there exists some c > 0 such that
〈v(x), x − xˆ〉 ≤ −c for all x ∈ K. (7.20)
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To proceed, let Dt = Dh(xˆ, X
t) as in the proof of Proposition 7.3. Then, tele-
scoping (7.16) yields the estimate
Dt+1 ≤ D1 +
t∑
s=1
γs〈v(Xt), Xt − xˆ〉+
t∑
s=1
γsξs +
t∑
s=1
γsβs +
t∑
s=1
(γs)2
2K
‖Y t‖2∗,
(7.21)
where the strong convexity modulus K is defined as K = miniKi, and, as in the
proof of Proposition 7.3, we set ξt = 〈U t, Xt − xˆ〉 and βt = 〈bt, Xt − xˆ〉. Hence,
setting St =
∑t
s=1 γ
s and using (7.20), we obtain
Dt+1 ≤ D1 − St
[
c−
∑t
s=1 γ
sξs
St
−
∑t
s=1 γ
sβs
St
− 1
2K
∑t
s=1(γ
s)2‖Y s‖2∗
St
]
. (7.22)
We proceed to analyze this bound term-by-term:
• First, by definition, we have E[ξt | F t−1] = 0, so the second term in the
brackets of (7.22) is itself a martingale. Furthermore, by (3.7b), we have
∞∑
t=1
(γt)2 E[(ξt)2 | F t−1] ≤
∞∑
t=1
(γt)2‖Xt − xˆ‖2 E[‖U t‖2∗ | F t−1]
≤ diam(X )2σ2
∞∑
t=1
(γt)2 <∞. (7.23)
Therefore, by the law of large numbers for martingale difference sequences
[19, Theorem 2.18], we conclude that (1/St)
∑t
s=1 γ
sξs converges to 0 with
probability 1.
• For the third term in the brackets of (7.22), we have βt ≤∑i∈N diam(Xi)Bti ,
so βt → 0 as t→∞. Since ∑∞t=1 γt =∞, it follows that ∑ts=1 γsβs/St →
0.
• Finally, for the last term, let Rt = (1/2K)∑ts=1(γs)2‖Y s‖2∗. We then have
E[Rt | F t−1] = 1
2K
E
[
t−1∑
s=1
(γs)2‖Y s‖2∗ +
(γt)2
2K
‖Y t‖2∗
∣∣∣∣∣F t−1
]
= Rt + (γt)2 E[‖Y t‖2∗ | F t−1] ≥ Rt, (7.24)
i.e., Rt is a submartingale relative to F t. Furthermore, by the law of total
expectation, we also have
E[Rt] = E[E[Rt | F t−1]] ≤ M
2
2K
∞∑
s=1
(γs)2 <∞, (7.25)
where we set M2 =
∑
i∈N M
2
i . In turn, this implies that R
t is uni-
formly bounded in L1 so, by Doob’s (sub)martingale convergence theo-
rem [19, Theorem 2.5], we conclude that Rt converges to some (almost
surely finite) random variable R∞ with E[R∞] <∞. Consequently, we get
limt→∞R
t/St = 0 with probability 1.
Combining all of the above, we infer that there exists some (possibly random,
but almost surely finite) t0 such that D
t ≤ D1− c/2 ·St for all t ≥ t0. In turn, this
implies that Dh(xˆ, X
t) → −∞ with probability 1, a contradiction. Going back to
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our original assumption, this shows that, with probability 1, xˆ is a limit point of
Xt, so our proof is complete. 
With these two results at hand, we are finally in a position to prove our Nash
equilibrium convergence theorem:
Proof of Theorem 7.2. Proposition 7.4 shows that, with probability 1, there exists
a (possibly random) subsequence tk such that X
tk → xˆ. By the reciprocity con-
dition (7.13), this implies that lim inf t→∞Dh(xˆ, X
t) = 0 (a.s.). However, since
limt→∞Dh(xˆ, X
t) exists with probability 1 by Proposition 7.3, it follows that
lim
t→∞
Dh(xˆ, X
t) = lim inf
t→∞
Dh(xˆ, X
t) = 0 (7.26)
i.e., Xt converges to xˆ. 
7.3. Convergence in two-player zero-sum games. We close this section with a con-
vergence result for two-player zero-sum games. To state it, assume as in Example 2.2
that the sequence of stage games encountered by the players is determined by a
sequence of smooth, convex-concave saddle functions f t : X1 × X2 → R so that
ut1 = −f t = −ut2. We then have:
Theorem 7.5. Let f t be a sequence of convex-concave saddle functions converging
to f : X1 ×X2 → R in the sense of (7.12). Assume further that each player follows
Algorithm 2 with a step-size sequence γt such that
∞∑
t=1
γt =∞,
∞∑
t=1
(γt)2 <∞, and
∞∑
t=1
γtBt <∞. (7.27)
Then, the time-averaged sequence of play X¯t =
∑t
s=1 γ
sXs
/∑t
s=1 γ
s converges to
the set of saddle-points of f with probability 1.
Proof. Let xˆ ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium of the limit game induced by f , and, as in
the proof of Proposition 7.4, let Dt = Dh(xˆ, X
t). Then, working as in Eq. (7.16),
we obtain the basic estimate
Dt+1 ≤ Dt + γt〈Y t, Xt − xˆ〉+ (γ
t)2
2K
‖Y t‖2∗, (7.28)
where we have set K = min{K1,K2}. Then, decomposing the input signal Y t as
in (7.15) and rearranging, we get:
γt〈v(Xt), xˆ−Xt〉 ≤ Dt −Dt+1 + γt〈U t + bt, Xt − xˆ〉+ (γ
t)2
2K
‖Y t‖2∗. (7.29)
Then, summing over t gives
t∑
s=1
γs〈v(Xs), xˆ−Xs〉 ≤ D1 −Dt+1 +
t∑
s=1
γs〈Us + bs, Xs − xˆ〉+
t∑
s=1
(γs)2
2K
‖Y s‖2∗
≤ D1 +
t∑
s=1
γsξs +
t∑
s=1
γsβs +
1
2K
Rt (7.30)
where, as in the proof of Proposition 7.4, we set ξt = 〈U t, Xt− xˆ〉, βt = 〈bt, Xt− xˆ〉,
and Rt =
∑t
s=1(γ
s)2‖Y s‖2∗. Hence, letting St =
∑t
s=1 γ
s and arguing in the same
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way as in the proof of Proposition 7.4 (which has the same step-size requirements),
we deduce that
lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 γ
sξs
St
= 0, lim
t→∞
∑t
s=1 γ
sβs
St
= 0, and lim
t→∞
Rt
St
= 0, (7.31)
with probability 1. On the other hand, given that f is convex-concave, we also have∑t
s=1 γ
s〈v(Xs), xˆ−Xs〉
St
≥ u1(xˆ1, xˆ2)− u1(X¯t1, xˆ2) + u2(xˆ1, xˆ2)− u2(xˆ1, X¯t2)
= f(X¯t1, xˆ2)− f(xˆ1, X¯t2). (7.32)
Therefore, combining all of the above, we conclude that
f(X¯t1, xˆ2)− f(xˆ1, X¯t2) ≤
D1
St
+ o(1), (7.33)
i.e., f(X¯t1, xˆ2)− f(xˆ1, X¯t2)→ 0 as t→∞. Since xˆ is a Nash equilibrium, this shows
that X¯t attains the value of f , i.e., X¯t converges itself to the set of saddle-points
of f , as claimed. 
In closing this section, there are two further points worth noting for Theorem 7.5.
First, if the limit game is strictly monotone (for instance, if f is strictly convex-
concave), Theorem 7.5 is essentially subsumed by Theorem 7.2: if the sequence of
playXt converges to the game’s unique equilibrium, then so does the corresponding
ergodic average X¯t =
∑t
s=1 γ
sXs
/∑t
s=1 γ
s. On the other hand, this leaves open
the non-strict case: for instance, if the game at hand is the mixed extension of
a two-player zero-sum finite game (i.e., f(x1, x2) = x
⊤
1 Ax2 for some matrix A of
appropriate dimensions), the limit game is not strictly monotone, so Theorem 7.2
does not apply (but Theorem 7.5 does).
Second, we should also note that Theorem 7.5 does not invoke the Bregman
reciprocity condition (7.13). The reason for this is that the analysis of the ergodic
average is not as delicate as that of the actual sequence of play. However, this
(technical) simplification comes at a price: specifically, Theorem 7.5 says little for
the convergence of Xt. In fact, even in the static case (f t = f for all t = 1, 2, . . . ),
the sequence of chosen actions might be recurrent or cycle around the game’s limit
Nash equilibrium without converging – see e.g., Mertikopoulos et al. [26]. This
represents a qualitative difference in behavior which cannot be detected by the
convergence of X¯t.
8. Concluding remarks
There are many interesting points for future research. First, we have been very
agnostic towards the data generating process of the game problem. With an eye
towards simulation based solution techniques, it is important to study time-varying
games generated by ergodic processes in the spirit of Duchi et al. [13]. For monotone
variational inequality problems subjected to Brownian noise, a first step in this
direction has been done by Mertikopoulos and Staudigl [28]. However, more effort
is needed to understand the asymptotic properties of the repeated game process
in this approach, possibly also using different assumptions on the driving random
process.
In view of applications to problems in traffic engineering, data science and control,
the study of a bona fide continuous-time version of the present approach is also a
promising research direction. Finally, considering generalized Nash equilibrium
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problems where the players’ actions are subject to (possibly time-varying) coupled
constraints is an important and challenging extension of the present framework,
which we also intend to investigate in a future paper.
Appendix A. Prox-Mappings
In this appendix we collect some basic technical facts on the prox-method. In
the following we let C be a convex compact domain in a finite-dimensional normed
vector space (V , ‖·‖), and h : C → R be a distance generating function with convexity
parameter K. The corresponding Bregman divergence is
Dh(x, x
′) = h(x) − h(x′)− 〈∇h(x′), x− x′〉 (A.1)
for x ∈ dom(h), x′ ∈ dom(h)◦. Define Θh(ai) = maxx∈CDh(ai, xi), and
xh = argmin{h(x) : x ∈ C}. (A.2)
Note that xh is uniquely defined thanks to the strong-convexity of h, and we have
〈∇h(xh), a− xh〉 ≥ 0 (A.3)
for all a ∈ C. From this it follows immediately that
Θ(xh) ≤ max
x∈C
h(x) −min
x∈C
h(x) =: D[C;h]. (A.4)
Furthermore, by K-strong convexity,
K
2
‖x− xh‖2 ≤ Dh(x, xh) ≤ Θh(xh). ∀x ∈ C. (A.5)
Hence,
‖x− xh‖ ≤
√
2
K
D[C, h] ∀x ∈ C, (A.6)
and
C ⊆ {a ∈ V| ‖a− xh‖ ≤
√
2D[C, h]/K}. (A.7)
Lemma A.1. Let
P (x, y) = argmin
a∈A
{〈y, a− x〉+Dh(a, x)}. (A.8)
Then
(1) V∗ ∋ s 7→ P (x, y) is single-valued.
(2) ‖P (x, y′)− P (x, y)‖ ≤ 1K ‖y′ − y‖∗.
(3) For all a, x ∈ A and all y, y′ ∈ V∗, we have
Dh(a, P (x, y)) ≤ Dh(a, x) + 〈y, a− P (x, y)〉 −Dh(P (x, y), x). (A.9)
Proof. (1) This is clear by strong convexity.
(2) Let a = P (x, y) and b = P (x, v). The optimality conditions at these points
are
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + s, x′ − a〉 ≥ 0, (A.10)
and
〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, x′ − b〉 ≥ 0 (A.11)
for all x, x′ ∈ X . Evaluating the first inequality at the point x′ = b and the
second inequality at the point x′ = a gives
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + s, b− a〉 ≥ 0, (A.12)
〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, b− a〉 ≤ 0. (A.13)
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Hence,
〈∇h(a)−∇h(x) + s, b− a〉 ≥ 〈∇h(b)−∇h(x) + v, b− a〉
⇔ 〈s− v, b − a〉 ≥ 〈∇h(b)−∇h(a), b − a〉 ≥ K‖a− b‖2 (A.14)
where the last inequality uses the K-strong convexity of the distance gen-
erating function h. Hence,
‖s− v‖∗ ≥ K‖a− b‖. (A.15)
(3) The three-point identity [10] gives
Dh(a, x) −Dh(a, c)−Dh(c, x) = 〈∇h(c)−∇h(x), a− c〉 (A.16)
Combined with the optimality condition satisfied by the point c = P (x, y),
we get
Dh(a, x) −Dh(a, P (x, y)) −Dh(P (x, y), x) = 〈∇h(P (x, y))−∇h(x), a − P (x, y)〉
≥ 〈−y, a− P (x, y)〉. (A.17)
Rearranging gives the desired inequality.

Eq. (A.9) provides the first step to derive regret bounds for the prox-method as
done in the main text. Using the Fenchel Young inequality
〈y, a− b〉 ≤ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗ +
K
2
‖a− b‖2 (A.18)
this inequality can be refined to
Dh(a, P (x, y))−Dh(a, x) ≤ 〈y, a− x〉+ 〈y, x− P (x, y)〉 −Dh(P (x, y), x)
≤ 〈y, a− x〉+ 1
2K
‖y‖2∗. (A.19)
The next Lemma provides a slight refinement of the previous one.
Lemma A.2. Let {vt}t∈N be a sequence in V∗. Define the process {Y t}t∈N by
Y t+1 = P (Y t, vt), Y 1 ∈ C◦ given. (A.20)
Then, for all T ≥ 1 and all a ∈ C◦, we have
T∑
t=1
〈vt, Y t − a〉 ≤ Dh(a, Y 1) + 1
2K
T∑
t=1
‖vt‖2∗. (A.21)
Proof. From Lemma A.1 and Eq. (A.19), we get
Dh(a, Y
t+1) ≤ Dh(a, Y t) + 〈vt, a− Y t〉+ ‖v
t‖2∗
2K
. (A.22)
Rearranging and telescoping gives
T∑
t=1
〈vt, Y t − a〉 ≤ Dh(a, Y 1)−Dh(a, Y T+1) + 1
2K
T∑
t=1
‖vt‖2∗
≤ Dh(a, Y 1) + 1
2K
T∑
t=1
‖vt‖2∗. (A.23)
The last inequality uses the non-negativity of the Bregman divergence. 
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Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 6.4
The purpose of this section is to prove Proposition 6.4, under the assumption
that the signal process satisfies Eq. (6.22). We need two intermediate technical
results.
Lemma B.1. Define
Φi,T =
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
2Ki
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
, (B.1)
and let ξti = 〈γtiU ti , Xti − Zti 〉. Set
Ξi,T =
T∑
t=1
ξti . (B.2)
Then, for all constants C1, C2 > 0, we have
P(Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T + C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp(−C1) + exp(−C22/4). (B.3)
where Γi,T :=
∑T
t=1 γ
t
i , and Ψi,T = 4M∗
√
2Di[Xi;hi]/Ki
√∑T
t=1(γ
t
i )
2.
Proof. By definition we have
Φi,T =
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
2Ki
(
‖Y ti ‖2∗ + ‖U ti ‖2∗
)
≤
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
2Ki
(
3‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2M2∗
)
(B.4)
Calling γti = 5M
2
∗ (γ
t
i )
2/(2Ki), gives
E
[
exp
(
3(γti)
2‖Y ti ‖2∗
2Kiγti
)]
≤ exp(3/5) (B.5a)
and
E
[
exp
(
(γti )
2M2∗
Kiγti
)]
≤ exp(2/5). (B.5b)
Hence,
E
[
exp
(
3(γti)
2‖Y ti ‖2∗ + 2(γti)2M2∗
2Kiγti
)]
≤ exp(1). (B.6)
Call Γi,T :=
∑T
t=1 γ
t
i . Then, Jensen’s inequality shows that
16
E[exp(Φi,T /Γi,T )] ≤ exp(1). (B.8)
Therefore, for all C1 > 0, Markov’s inequality readily implies
P(Φi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T ) = P(exp(Φi,T /Γi,T ) ≥ exp(1 + C1))
16The convexity of the mapping x 7→ exp(x) shows the following: Let {at}t≥1, {bt}t≥1 be
sequences in (0,∞). Then, by Jensen’s inequality, we have
T∑
t=1
at∑T
ℓ=1 aℓ
exp
(
bt
at
)
≥ exp
(
T∑
t=1
bt∑T
ℓ=1 aℓ
)
. (B.7)
We apply this inequality with the identification bt =
3(γti )
2
2Ki
‖Y ti ‖
2
∗ +
(γti )
2
Ki
M2∗ and at = γ
t
i .
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≤ exp(−1− C1)E [exp(Φi,T /Γi,T )] (B.9)
≤ exp(−C1). (B.10)
Now, let ξti = 〈γtiU ti , Xti −Zti 〉 and set Ξi,T =
∑T
t=1 ξ
t
i . Observe that E[ξ
t
i | Ft−1] = 0
for all t ≥ 1. Therefore Ξi,T is a martingale with respect to the filtration F :=
{Ft}t≥1, which is also bounded in L2(Ω,F ,F,P), thanks to (6.26).
Via the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the Ki-strong convexity of the distance gen-
erating function, as well as eqs. (A.2) and (A.7), we see that
|ξti | ≤ γti‖U ti ‖∗ · ‖Xti − Y ti ‖i
≤ γti‖U ti ‖∗
[‖Xti − xhi‖i + ‖xhi − Y ti ‖i]
≤ 2γti‖U ti ‖∗
√
2
Ki
D[Xi, hi] (B.11)
Hence,
‖U ti ‖2∗ ≥
Ki|ξti |2
8(γti )
2D[Xi, hi] . (B.12)
Consequently,
E
[
exp
(
Ki|ξti |2
32(γti)
2D[Xi, hi]M2∗
) ∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
≤ E
[
exp
(
‖U ti ‖2∗
4M2∗
)]
. (B.13)
For all t ≥ 1, denote by τ ti := 4γtiM∗
√
2D[Xi, hi]/Ki. Using (6.26), this shows that
E
[
exp
(
(ξti/τ
t
i )
2
) ∣∣∣ Fˆt] ≤ exp(1). (B.14)
Since Ξi,t = Ξi,t−1 + ξ
t
i , we get for all δ > 0
E[exp(δΞi,t)] = E[exp(δΞi,t−1) exp(δξ
t
i )] = E[exp(δΞi,t−1)E[exp(δξ
t
i) | Fˆt]] (B.15)
Following [33], we see that for all δ > 0 and t ≥ 1
E[exp(δξti ) | Fˆt] ≤ exp
(
δ2(τ ti )
2
)
. (B.16)
Proceeding by induction, we observe that for all δ > 0,
E[exp(δΞi,T )] ≤ exp
(
δ2
T∑
t=1
(τ ti )
2
)
. (B.17)
Therefore, if we set Ψi,T =
√∑T
t=1(τ
t
i )
2, Markov’s inequality yields the immediate
bound
P(Ξi,T ≥ C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp (−δC2Ψi,T )E[exp(δΞi,T )]
≤ exp (−δC2Ψi,T + δ2Ψ2i,T ) . (B.18)
Then, setting δ = C22Ψi,T yields
P(Ξi,T ≥ C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp(−C22/2 + C22/4) = exp(−C22/4) (B.19)
for all C2 > 0. Combining this with the bound (B.10), we conclude that for all
C1, C2 > 0,
P(Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T + C2Ψi,T ) ≤ exp(−C1) + exp(−C22/4). (B.20)
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To see this, introduce the events E3 = {Ξi,T +Φi,T ≥ (1+C1)Γi,T +C2Ψi,T }, E1 =
{Φi,T ≥ (1 + C1)Γi,T } and E2 = {Ξi,T ≥ C2Ψi,T }. Then E3 ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, so that
P(E3) ≤ P(E1 ∪ E2) ≤ P(E1) + P(E2). 
Lemma B.2. For C > 0, define
Qi,T (C) := 2D[Xi, hi] + (1 + C)Γi,T + 2
√
CΨi,T
= 2D[Xi, hi] + (1 + C) 5
2Ki
M2∗
T∑
t=1
(γti )
2
+ 8
√
2CD[Xi, hi]/KiM∗
√√√√ T∑
t=1
(γti )
2. (B.21)
For all T ≥ 1 and for all ε ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− ε, we have
Gapi(T ) ≤ Qi,T (log(2/ε)). (B.22)
Proof. Observe that E[ξti | Ft−1] = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Therefore Ξi,T , defined in (B.2),
is a martingale with respect to the filtration F := {Ft}t≥1, which is also bounded
in L2(Ω,F ,F,P), thanks to (6.26).
Now, Eq. (6.15) implies that
Gapi(T ) ≤ 2D[Xi, hi] + Φi,T + Ξi,T , (B.23)
so {Gapi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)} ⊆ {Φi,T +Ξi,T ≥ (1+C)Γi,T +2
√
CΨi,T }. Consequently,
from Lemma B.1, we deduce that for all C > 0,
P(Gapi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)) ≤ 2 exp(−C). (B.24)
Choosing C = log(2/ε) proves our claim. 
Proof of Proposition 6.4. From the variational characterization (4.7) for the exter-
nal regret, the Prox-strategy with a constant step-size γti ≡ γi gives
Regi(T ) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
T∑
t=1
〈vti(Xt), xi −Xti 〉 ≤
2D[Xi, hi]
γi
+
1
γi
(Φi,T + Ξi,T ). (B.25)
Hence, for all ρ > 0,
{Regi(T ) ≥ ρ} ⊆ {Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ γiρ− 2D[Xi, hi]}. (B.26)
Therefore, choosing ρ = Qi,T (C)/γi we deduce from Eq. (B.3) that
P(Regi(T ) ≥ Qi,T (C)/γi) ≤ P(Φi,T + Ξi,T ≥ (1 + C)Γi,T + 2
√
CΨi,T ) ≤ 2 exp(−C).
(B.27)
Picking C = log(2/ε), for any ε ∈ (0, 1) fixed, we get the desired (1− ε)-probability
bound. Now, observe that for a constant step-size, we have
Qi,T (log(2/ε))
γi
=
2D[Xi, hi]
γi
+
5(1 + log(2/ε))M2∗
2Ki
γiT (B.28)
+ 8M∗
√
2 log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki
√
T . (B.29)
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Call Ωi(ε) :=
5(1+log(2/ε))M2
∗
2Ki
, and optimizing the above expression with respect to
γi, gives the optimal constant step-size
γi =
√
2D[Xi, hi]
Ωi(ε)T
. (B.30)
Using this step size in the previous display gives
Qi,T (log(2/ε))
γi
= 2
√
2TD[Xi, hi]Ωi(ε) + 8M∗
√
2T log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki. (B.31)
This shows that, with probability at least 1− ε, we have
Regi(T ) ≤ 2
√
2TD[Xi, hi]Ωi(ε) + 8M∗
√
2T log(2/ε)D[Xi, hi]/Ki (B.32)
and our proof is complete. 
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